University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1980

Administrative Rulemaking and Judicial Review: Some
Conceptual Models
Daniel J. Gifford

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gifford, Daniel J., "Administrative Rulemaking and Judicial Review: Some Conceptual Models" (1980).
Minnesota Law Review. 1078.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1078

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Administrative Rulemaking and Judicial
Review: Some Conceptual Models
Daniel J. Gifford*
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of observers presently believe that much federal
rulemaking has become unduly complex, time-consuming,
costly, and unwieldly, 1 primarily because of the transformation
of judicial review of rules promulgated after informal procedures into review on the administrative record. Former dean
Carl Auerbach, for example, believes that this change in judicial review in the last decade has profoundly and adversely af2
fected the rulemaking process on the administrative level.
Auerbach suggests that requiring an agency to prepare a defense to all potential challengers of a proposed rule, regardless
of the actual number or content of the challenges, imposes unnecessary costs and delays upon rulemaking,3 and places additional burdens on courts that must cope with the voluminous
and incoherent records generated by such procedures. 4 William Pedersen expressed a similar concern about the volume
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. The most articulate statement of this position is found in Auerbach, Informal Rule Making: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedures and JudicialReview, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 15, 60-61 (1977). Justice Rehnquist
evinced a concern that informal rulemaking proceedings remain free from
court-imposed trial-type procedures and that the use of Administrative Procedures Act § 553 proceedings be expanded. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 453 U.S. 519, 542-49 (1978)
(discussing 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976)); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224 (1973). Professor Nathanson cautiously warned that the ramifications of an
expansive on-the-record approach to informal rulemaking would produce adverse effects upon that process. See Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee
on Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 AD. L.
REV. 377, 403-05 (1978). See also Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564
F.2d 458, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1977). William Pedersen suggested that rulemaking
processes at the administrative level have been insufficiently disciplined and as
a result an unduly severe review burden has been imposed on the courts. See
Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE. L.J. 38, 71-73
(1975).
2. Auerbach, supra note 1, at 60-61.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 60.
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and incoherence of the administrative records upon which
courts have been required to review environmental rules.5
Justice Rehnquist, another articulate critic of the administrative process, believes that the primary factor impairing the
efficiency of federal rulemaking proceedings is the incorporation of cross-examination and other procedural devices drawn
from the judicial tradition. Rehnquist's opinions in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
7
Council, Inc.,6 United States v. FloridaEast Coast Railway,
and United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Cop.8 were directed towards eliminating evidentiary hearing procedures in
agency rulemaking, although he apparently favors the reviewon-the-record approach to informal rulemaking. 9 Nevertheless,
the tendencies of the lower federal courts to order agencies to
employ time-consuming trial-type procedures in rulemaking
proceedings have been the result of an on-the-record approach
to judicial review of informal rulemaking.10
The problems associated with judicial review on the
rulemaking record and the circumstances in which such review
is appropriate are thus ripe for reassessment. After discussing
the Supreme Court's recent approach to rulemaking review and
the problematic assumptions underlying this approach, this Article will analyze Carl Auerbach's proposed procedure for
rulemaking review and the problems raised by his proposal. A
discussion of several models of rulemaking procedures and judicial review of such procedures provides the basis for this
analysis. Finally, this Article will suggest that further empirical
5. Pedersen, supra note 1, at 51-60.
6. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
7. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
8. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
9. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. at 549 (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143
(1973)); note 29 infra.
10. Professor Nathanson examined several lower court cases and commented:
[T]he apparent freedom of the section 553 proceeding has now become
at least partly illusory. Once those [section 553] proceedings ... were
treated not merely as a source of education for the agency but also as
the record basis for judicial review, it became necessary to infuse them
with additional procedural safeguards. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that some of the basic principles of sections 556 and 557 have been
grafted onto informal rulemaking proceedings, both to assure the essentials of due process and to provide an intelligible basis for judicial
review.
Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and
Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and
Other FederalStatutes, 75 CoLum. L. REV. 721, 756 (1975).

1980]

ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING

study of the development of federal administrative law is necessary to determine the types of new procedures that would
best improve judicial review of agency rules.
I.

JUDICIAL REVIEW ON THE RULEMAKING RECORD:
PROBLEMS AND APPROPRIATENESS

Judicial review of rules on the record of the rulemaking
proceeding requires that all material relevant to assessing the
validity of the rules, including "factual" material, be found in
the administrative record. Thus, people who wish to attack the
validity of an administrative rule in court will find it necessary-or almost necessary-to participate in the rulemaking
proceeding to lay the foundation for a judicial challenge to the
rule. Judicial review on the rulemaking record thus presumes a
role for the informal rulemaking proceeding beyond its historic
function as a device for collecting information for the agency."
Judicial review on the record requires the informal proceeding
to adopt a role similar to the role that formal rulemaking has
traditionally played: it is the initial adversarial arena in which
all of the affected interests assert their respective concerns and
underlying factual contentions and critique those of their ad12
versaries.
11. See ATToRNEY's GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, FINAL REPORT, S. Doc.
No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 101-02 (1941) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
The authors of the FINAL REPORT concluded that normally the purpose of
rulemaking proceedings is "to enlighten the administrative agency and to protect private interests against uninformed or unwise action." Id. at 108. See also
Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative ProcedureAct: Background, Construction,
Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA
L. REV. 731, 845-48 (1975); Gifford, Report on Administrative Law to the Tennessee Law Revision Commission, 20 VAND. L. REV. 777, 786-87, 791-92 (1967); Nathanson, supra note 10, at 754-55 (1975). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIvE PROCEDURE ACT 31-32
(1947); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6.01-.02 (1958).
12. See the description in the FINAL REPORT.
It may be clear in advance which interests will benefit and which will
suffer if proposed regulations are issued. Low-cost producers as
against high-cost producers with respect to maximum prices or minimum wages; workers as against employers with respect to wages or
working conditions; buyers as against sellers with respect to the regulation of agricultural marketing; the makers of machinery which will be
barred by proposed safety regulations as against others whose product
will be lawful; these are recurring divisions of interested parties which
from time to time confront an administrative agency engaged in
rulemaking. Frequently the number of parties constituting a single interest is small and existing members are known. In any event, whether
their number is great or small, they may often gain or lose with relative
finality in the rulemaking proceeding itselL The content of the regulations when issued may be definite and the consequences of noncompli-
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On-the-record rulemaking does, in some circumstances,
possess the advantage of resolving at one time all of the claims
of various interest groups concerned with the substance of a
proposed rule. When the interests of identifiable persons or
groups sharply clash over disputed issues of fact or policy, and
when each of these interest groups is aware of the impact of a
proposed rule and is capable of vigorously asserting its position
in the rulemaking proceedings,13 an on-the-record proceeding is
appropriate. Such a proceeding allows each interest to present
its own affirmative case and critique the positions of the opposing groups. Informed by the information and arguments that
this basically adversarial procedure has elicited and tested, the
agency is able to act. Judicial review should then swiftly follow
because all of the affected interests have participated in the
rulemaking proceeding and can effectively point out to the
court any deficiencies in the proceedings or in the agency's response to them as embodied in the final rule.14
The feasibility of an adversarial on-the-record proceeding
may be impaired, however, when the issues are complex and
many-faceted.' 5 The greater the number of disputed issues, the
more sides of each issue, and the more the resolution of each
issue is inextricably intertwined with other related and similarly complex issues, the greater will be the demand placed
ance severe, such as the loss of the right to do business. Under these
circumstances it may be desirable to let affected parties treat the rulemaking proceedings as adversary, so that all the information, conclusions, and arguments submitted to the agency may be publicly disclosed to opposing interests which may answer, explain, or rebut.
FiNAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 108-09.
13. But see note 17 infra and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 669-71
(6th Cir. 1972).
15. According to the authors of the FrNAL REPORT.
The application of the procedures of a judicial trial to administrative rule making is limited... by the distinctive characteristics of rule
making proceedings. The issues are normally complex and numerous;
the parties may be diverse and not alignable into classes; the outcome
will involve a judgment concerning the consequences of rules to be
prescribed for the future and a discretion in devising measures to effectuate the policies of the statute. These factors differentiate these proceedings from the normal judicial trial in which adversary hearings are
traditionally -employed and accordingly limit the possibility of defining
issues in advance, of addressing evidence to them, of permitting systematic cross-examination, and of stating the findings and conclusions
fully.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 109.
For discussions of so-called "polycentric" controversies, see Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex Scientific,
Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MCH.L. REV. 111, 116-20 (1972); Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication,92 HARv.L REV. 353, 394-404 (1978).
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upon the agency's managerial capabilities. At some point,
these demands may exceed the agency's ability to manage
6
within the confines of an adversarial on-the-record format.'
Other factors may also lessen the appropriateness of an onthe-record format. For example, when the interests affected are
diverse, scattered, and unorganized, the affected groups may be
unable to perform the demanding role that on-the-record proceedings contemplate. Neither these proceedings nor the resulting rules will then adequately reflect the concerns of these
unorganized interest groups.17 Indeed, a lack of organization
may not only impair the ability of such groups to participate
fully in the rulemaking proceedings, but may also impede the
effective receipt of actual notice by affected persons, first, of the
commencement of rulemaking proceedings and later, of the
promulgation of rules pursuant to those proceedings. 18
Finally, rules that adversely affect scattered and unorganized interests seem inappropriate candidates for judicial review
confined to the rulemaking record. Because such interests are
unlikely to have participated vigorously in the rulemaking proceedings, they will have contributed little or nothing to that
record and hence will be disadvantaged in the contentions
open to them on review.' 9 Moreover, some contemporary statutory formats that combine the on-the-record approach with a
short time limitation governing petitions for judicial review 20
further disadvantage unorganized groups. Under such statutes,
16. See Professor Jaffe's discussion of the procedural problems raised by
the doctrine of Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), in L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 445 (1965).
17. See Bonfield, Representationfor the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67
MICH. L. REV. 511-23 (1969).
18. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 283 n.2 (1978).
See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433-34 (1944).
19. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra. See also National Welfare
Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
20. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) (1976); Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,
15 U.S.C. § 78y(b) (1976); Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1193(e) (1976); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1394(a) (1976);
Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2060(a) (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1976); Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n) (Supp. 11I 1979);
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976); Federal
Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 816(a) (1) (Supp.
II 1978); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)-(c) (1976); Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 2022(c) (2) (Supp. II 1978); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1), § 7607(d) (3)-(7) (Supp. II 1978); Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c) (3), (5)-(6) (Supp. II 1978).
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the failure to seek "direct" review within the prescribed period
may preclude challengers from seeking judicial review21 or severely limit their ability to obtain the relief that they seek.2 2
Unorganized interests are unlikely to be able to act within the
prescribed time period or even to learn of their formal opportunities for judicial review.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH AND THE
AUERBACH PROPOSAL: AN OVERVIEW

The Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of an apparently
universal requirement that judicial review take place on the
"administrative record" 23 and its accompanying prohibition
against reviewing courts ordering cross-examination or other
trial-type procedures in informal rulemaking proceedings appear designed to simplify the rulemaking process at the administrative level.24 The Court apparently believes that judicial
review of informal rulemaking best takes place exclusively on
an administrative record that has been prepared in proceedings
over which the agency concerned has sole control.
The Court's attempt at simplification of informal rulemaking proceedings rests upon certain problematic assumptions,
however. One such assumption appears to be that persons objecting to the validity of rules will be able to assert their positions effectively in the comment proceedings under procedures
there available to them. On the surface, Justice Rehnquist
seems to have concluded for the Court that testimony and
cross-examination are rarely necessary to a challenger's attack
on a rule. Indeed, Rehnquist almost seems to have attributed
21. See the discussion of the implications of a short limitations period governing petitions for direct review of rulemaking for later challenges to the validity of a rule in enforcement proceedings in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States, 434 U.S. 275, 278-85 (1978), and Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 534 F.2d 541, 550-51 (3d Cir. 1976). In
each of the cited cases, challenge to rule validity was permitted in an enforcement proceeding. In Adamo the Court expressed reluctance to cut off review
and therefore construed the statute narrowly to allow review in the case before
it. The Court indicated, however, that certain types of rules, issued under other
provisions of the Act before it, would be unreviewable after the short time period for petitioning for direct review had passed. In the Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores case, the court permitted direct review of a rule after the time had run
for direct review, but placed the burden of establishing the invalidity of the
rule upon the challenger, a burden which the challenger would not have borne
in a direct review proceeding. See 534 F.2d at 551-52.
22. See the discussion of Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, note 21 supra.
23. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978).
24. Id. at 546-48.
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this conclusion to Congress through its enactment of section
553 of the Administrative Procedure Act,25 even though it was
not until the 1970s that the courts imposed upon section 553 the
function of creating an exclusive record for the judicial review
of rules. 26 Although Rehnquist concedes that the Constitution
might sometimes require trial-type procedures in those
rulemaking proceedings that are to serve as an exclusive basis
for judicial review, 2 7 his language suggests that this would
rarely be the case.2 8 Rehnquist's mandate for review on the administrative record 29 is even more problematic because such a
mandate assumes that the advantages that review on the record undoubtedly possesses in some regulatory circumstances
are typically present in all rulemaking circumstances.
These problematic assumptions demand that the relationship between rulemaking procedures and judicial review of
rulemaking be reassessed. One recent reassessment has been
made by former dean Carl Auerbach, who has argued that judicial review on a record of a protest proceeding brought before
an agency by an individual protestant would provide a more
workable format than the present on-the-rulemaking-record approach. Auerbach's proposal is designed to free informal
rulemaking from the constraints that review on-the-record has
imposed and yet provide reviewing courts with a workable record on which to base their review. Indeed, a virtue of
25. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L No. 89-554, § 553, 80 Stat. 378
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976)). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. at 546.
26. The developments through which the courts imposed this new role on
section 553 and thereby drastically altered the mechanics of both informal
rulemaking and judicial review of informal rulemaking are described in
Auerbach, supra note 1, at 31-38; Gifford, The Morgan Cases: A Retrospective
View, 30 AD. L. REv. 237, 256-70 (1978); Nathanson, supra note 10, at 746-70.
27. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 & n.16 (1978). See also Williams, "Hybrid
Rulemaking" under the Administrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 401, 413 (1975).
28. Rehnquist's extended discussion of the need for agencies to control
their own procedures implies that the exceptions he recognizes would arise
only infrequently. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 542-49 (1978).
29. We... remand so that the Court of Appeals may review the rule
as the Administrative Procedure Act provides. We have made it abundantly clear before that when there is a contemporaneous explanation
of the agency decision, the validity of that action must "stand or fall on
the propriety of that finding, judged, of course, by the appropriate standard of review. If that finding is not sustainable on the administrative
record made, then the Comptroller's decision must be vacated and the
matter remanded to him for further consideration."
Id. at 549 (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)).
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Auerbach's proposal is that it would produce a better focused
and more coherent record.3 0
A brief discussion of several models of rulemaking and judicial review of rulemaking will provide a foundation for comparing Auerbach's proposed review on the record of a protest
proceeding with Rehnquist's imposition of review on the record
of the original agency rulemaking proceeding.
IV.

SIX ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF AGENCY
RULEMAKING PROCEDURES

The first model of agency rulemaking procedures is the
traditional one. 31 The agency uses notice-and-comment procedures for informational purposes only, and the rules created
are subject to collateral attack 32 in enforcement, injunctive, or
declaratory proceedings. In the traditional model, there is no
exclusive rulemaking record; the record for judicial review is
compiled in the proceedings collaterally attacking the rule. In
these collateral proceedings an indefinite number of people
might object to the rule and might challenge its factual premise.3 3 Because the doctrine of res judicata binds only persons
in privity with each other,34 the traditional model theoretically
allows an indefinite number of lawsuits relitigating essentially
the same factual issues, a result contrary to efficient administration. In addition, because this first model permits full evidentiary hearings in court challenges, it is inconsistent with the
Court's mandates in the Overton Park line of cases 35 that insist
30. See Auerbach, supra note 1, at 61, 63-64; Gifford, supra note 26, at 284.
31. It is traditional in the sense that it describes rulemaking and rulemaking review in the manner envisioned by the drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 1, at 21-23, 24-26. Mandatory noticeand-comment procedure was an innovation of the Administrative Procedure
Act, see id. at 21, although prior to its enactment many agencies had engaged in
various forms of consultation with affected interests and/or had held legislative-type hearings before issuing rules. See FmNAL REPORT, supra note 11, at
103-08.
32. See, e.g., FiNAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 115-16; Auerbach, supra note
1, at 24.
33. That is, they. might challenge the set of factual assumptions on which
the rule is based. For a discussion of the evolution of judicial review of the factual premises underlying agency rules, see Gifford, Rulemaking and Rulemaking Review: Struggling Towards a New Paradigm,32 AD. L REV. 577, 580-95
(1980).
34.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1942).

35. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 143 (1973); United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 755-56, 758 (1972); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). See also NBC v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943); Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426, 434 (1936); Tagg
Bros. & Moorehead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 443-44 (1930).
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upon judicial review on an administrative record prepared in
comment proceedings.
In the second model, although the agency uses notice-andcomment procedures for informational purposes only and the
rules are again subject to collateral attack in enforcement, injunctive, or declaratory proceedings, review is exclusively on
the administrative record. 36 Persons objecting to rules on the
basis of evidence or other information must present that material in the comment proceeding, but challengers may present
critiques of the analyses incorporated into the agency's stated
rationale directly to the court.37 Judicial review under this
model is reminiscent of review as described in Overton Park
and its progeny because the agency action is judged only by
the matter in the administrative record but the person challenging the agency action is free to argue that the agency's rationale and its supporting props are inadequate to sustain the
action as rationally based.3 8 To the extent that the agency
bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its
rule,3 9 however, this model would exacerbate the administra40
tive problems created under the traditional model. An indefinite number of people could still have the opportunity to
challenge the ultimate factual conclusions underpinning the
rule by challenging the adequacy of their analytical support
structures, but the exclusive rulemaking record would restrict
the agency to the factual support that it offered at the time of
the rule's promulgation. The agency would thus be cast in the
position of defending its performance against an indefinite
number of challengers who have the advantages of hindsight
41
and the cumulative experience of previous challengers.
36. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 669 (6th
Cir. 1972). See also City of Chicago v. Federal Power Corm'n, 458 F.2d 731, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
37. To the extent that this second model allows objectors to raise objections in court that were not initially made before the agency, it is inconsistent
with the general mandates of cases such as Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). Even
in that case, however, the court found an exception pursuant to which it could
consider objections made for the first time in court. Cf. International Harvester
Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court reviiews EPA methodology even though no comment on methodology was made in agency proceeding).
38. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
39. See Gifford, supra note 33, at 593-94.
40. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
41. Whether an agency could actually be placed in the awkward position
described depends upon whether the courts would treat this evaluating function as sufficiently "factual" to fall within the scope of the doctrines of res judi-
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The third model also requires an exclusive record for
agency action and for judicial review. This model substantially
reduces the administrative disadvantage created in the second
model, however, by limiting the arguments that objectors can
make in court to those that they have previously made before
the agency in the rulemaking proceeding. 42 Such a limitation is
consonant with review on an exclusive rulemaking record because it concentrates objections to rules in the rulemaking proceedings. 43 The agency's disadvantage is also reduced by
limiting the time period in which challenges to rules can be
made in court 1 --an appropriate limitation to the extent that all
serious objections have already been initially expressed in the
rulemaking proceeding.
In this third model, interested and affected persons have
the right to submit written comments on proposed rules under
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or other
equivalent statutory provisions, but further participatory opportunities in rulemaking are dependent upon agency discretion or upon special statutory procedures. 45 Direct review
cata and collateral estoppel rather than within the broader scope of the
doctrine of stare decisis. See Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through
Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 781, 805 n.119 (1965).
42. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
43. See also Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 432-44 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503, 520-21 (1944); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 670
(6th Cir. 1972).
44. Statutes providing for so-called "direct" judicial review of agency
rulemaking typically establish a short (e.g., 60 days) time limit within which
that review may be sought. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) (1) (A) (1976) (60 days); Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b) (1) (1976) (60 days); Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1193(e) (1) (1976) (60 days); National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1394(a) (1) (1976) (60 days); Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2060(a) (1976) (60 days); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976) (60 days); Federal Mines Safety and Health Amendments
Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 816(a) (1) (1978) (30 days).
A time limit on judicial review of a rule seems inappropriate when significant numbers of persons affected adversely by the rule are unlikely to become
aware of its existence until the time limit has expired. See Adamo Wrecking
Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 283 n.2 (1978). If, however, the potential objectors to the rule are likely to be aware of, and indeed participate in, the
rulemaking proceedings, then such a time limit will not foreclose significant
numbers of persons from seeking review.
45. In this respect, this third model is consistent with the mandates of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 547 (1978).
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takes place on the administrative record, 46 and the court assesses the rationality of agency action in light of the information provided by the rulemaking record. The scope of review
conforms to the description of a reviewing court's duties contained in the Overton Park opinion. 47 Such review can properly
be characterized, therefore, as rationality review. But because
that review closely follows the details of the agency's reasoning
from matters in the record to ultimate factual conclusions, it
48
also seems consistent with "substantial evidence" review.
49
This third model is consonant with recent regulatory statutes
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA).50 It is also largely consistent with the assumptions
5
underlying Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Vermont Yankee. 1
The fourth model not only allows interested and affected
persons to submit written comments on proposed rules, but
also gives them the right to use evidentiary-hearing procedures
(including the right to cross-examine witnesses) on issues for
which such procedures are especially appropriate. This
model's structure thus resembles that built into the Federal
46. See Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756, 758 (1972); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971).
47. Thus the court should decide whether the agency has acted within the
scope of its authority, and in this connection should determine whether the
agency could have reasonably believed in the factual premise on which its rule
was based. The court should also decide whether the agency decision was
based on a "consideration of the relevant factors" and whether the agency eggregiously misweighed them. Finally, the court should decide whether the
agency's decision was made in a procedurally correct manner. See Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1971).
48. "Substantial evidence" review has sometimes been understood as consonant with greater judicial involvement in tracing the logic of agency reasoning to its ultimate factual conclusions than has "rationality" review. For a
discussion of the evolution of the relationship between the standards, see Gifford, supra note 33, at 580-84. See also Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499
F.2d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 432, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973); Gifford, supra note 26,
at 265-66; Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmakingand the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 540-41; Verkuil, JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking,
60 VA. L. REV. 185, 247-48 (1974).
49. It is consonant with recent regulatory statutes insofar as the substantial-evidence review imposed by these statutes coalesces with the probing type
of rationality review described in Overton Park. See Gifford, supra note 26, at
265-66.
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
51. Vermont Yankee's contemplation of review on the "administrative record" pursuant to "the appropriate standard for review" and its focus upon preserving the efficiencies of informal rulemaking by forbidding the courts to
impose extra-statutory procedures on the agencies are consistent with this
third model. See 435 U.S. at 542-49.
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Trade Commission Improvements Act.52 Under this model direct review of rulemaking takes place on the "administrative
record." 53 The rationality of agency action is assessed by the
reviewing court in the light of the information provided by the
rulemaking record, or, alternatively as many of the newer regulatory statutes provide, 5 4 agency action is assessed-at least on
factual questions-under a substantial-evidence criterion.
This fourth model as so far described contains a latent ambiguity concerning the types of issues for which cross-examination would be allowed, however. While, at a minimum, the
fourth model contemplates that testimonial evidence about the
occurrence of relevant physically perceivable events5 5 would be
subject to cross-examination, 56 the description of the fourth
model has not yet specified whether cross-examination would
be allowed to reveal errors in scientific analysis 57 or to clarify
the bases for the conclusory findings relied upon by the agency
as justifications for its rule.5 8 Although in practice cross-examination for these latter purposes would blend together, two variations of this model can be hypothesized. In one, crossexamination on matters of scientific analysis is allowed when
such examination is designed to disclose logical errors. The
other variation allows, in addition, the cross-examination of
witnesses who tender conclusory testimony on crucial ques52. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (1976).
53. See note 46 supra. See also 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) (1976).
54. E.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) (3) (A) (1976); Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,
15 U.S.C. § 78y(b) (4) (1976); Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1193(e) (1976);
Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2060(c) (1976); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f)
(1976); Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§ 816(a) (1) (Supp. 111978).
55. Such testimony, for example, might concern whether the observer did
or did not remain in the room during the time at which a chemical reaction occurred.
56. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e) (3) (B) (1976); H.R. R.P. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 46, reprintedin [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7728.
57. Professor Williams believes that on methodological issues other procedures may be more productive than cross-examination. See Williams, supra
note 27, at 437-40, 443-45.
58. It was the conclusory testimony of Dr. Pittman about the environmental effects of nuclear waste storage and the "complete absence of any probing
of its underlying basis" that was a primary cause of Judge Bazelon's dissatisfaction with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proceeding involved in the
Vermont Yankee litigation. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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tions when the purpose of such examination is to clarify the bases for those conclusions.
Model four and its two variations respect the limited constitutional right 59 of persons affected by rulemaking to challenge the factual premises of rules by allowing the use of crossexamination and other evidentiary hearing procedures on appropriate issues. 60 The exclusive rulemaking record aspect of
this procedure, however, requires that the procedural rights of
affected persons be exercised in the rulemaking proceedings.
Accordingly, the validity of the entire rulemaking proceeding
will be jeopardized by the wrongful refusal of the agency to accord a procedural right-such as cross-examination-demanded by a participating party. Because of the serious
consequences of an erroneous denial of such a demand, agencies will be pressured to resolve doubtful questions in favor of
allowing cross-examination and other judicialized procedures.
Thus, as Justice Rehnquist has feared,6 1 this model of rulemaking would become increasingly skewed towards judicialized
procedures and away from the efficiencies of informal procedures.
The fifth model is similar to the third model, except provision is made for dealing in the course of judicial review with
those objections to rule validity that can effectively be made
only through evidentiary hearing procedures. Under this model
it is assumed that Congress intended to preserve, as much as
possible, the efficiencies of notice-and-comment rulemaking. It
is also assumed that rule validity is determined by the correspondence of the agency's factual predicate with facts in the actual world as they can be discovered through evidentiary
hearing procedures. Rule challengers asserting an error in the
agency's factual premise, demonstrable only through evidentiary hearing processes, would have a statutory right to use
such evidentiary processes in court proceedings. 62 This model
59. See Nathanson, supra note 10, at 757.
60. Of course, this evidentiary hearing procedure imposes a substantial
burden upon the rulemaking proceedings that must both preserve the rights of
those persons affected and preserve society's interests by efficiently producing
informed and justified rules. The societal interests were the focus of Judge
Wright's plea to abandon the trend of the hybrid cases towards increased
judicialization of rulemaking proceedings-a plea to which the Court in Vermont Yankee seems to have responded. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547 & n.20 (1978).
61. See id. at 547.
62. In contrast to model four and its variations, this model does not allow
evidentiary hearing procedures in the rulemaking proceedings, but it allows
them in a court proceeding attacking rule validity. Unlike the first or tradi-
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differs from the third model in that it provides a limited use for
evidentiary hearings in proceedings attacking rule validity. It
differs from the fourth model and its two variations in that evidentiary hearing procedures are not available in the rulemaking proceedings, but are available only in a proceeding
attacking rule validity in court. It differs from the first (or
traditional) model in that evidentiary-hearing procedures are
available to attack rule validity only on those factual issues on
which notice-and-comment procedures are demonstrably inadequate. This model is basically consistent with Vermont Yankee, because it preserves the efficiencies of informal procedure,
but it also adopts a judicial analogue to the administrative-level
procedures formalized by the Office of Price Administration
(OPA) almost four decades ago. 63 The OPA procedures provided a limited right to evidentiary hearing procedures to the
extent that particular objectors could demonstrate that such
procedures were necessary to ventilate the issues that they
64
were raising.
The sixth model assumes that Congress intended agencies
to act upon the basis of the best information available through
notice-and-comment proceedings, and that the agency action
thus authorized should not be subject to attack in evidentiary
hearings. Since persons objecting to rule validity would have
no statutory right to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the
agency's factual premises through evidentiary hearings, the
sole question would be whether such persons would have a
limited constitutional right to attack the factual underpinnings
of the rule through such procedures. Any such constitutional
right would be a limited one, however. Nathanson's contention 65 that Congress could not insulate agency action from judicial scrutiny implicitly admits that agency action would have to
be reviewed only for rationality. A rationality criterion would
be satisfied if the person challenging the rule failed to disprove
the existence of the agency's factual predicate in an evidentiary
tional model, this model allows evidentiary hearings only on those factual issues on which notice-and-comment procedures are demonstrably inadequate.
63. See note 70 infra.
64. Thus, under the OPA procedures, oral hearings were conditioned upon
a showing that a purely documentary presentation by the protestant would be
inadequate for "the fair and expeditious disposition of the issues." See Direct
Realty Co. v. Porter, 157 F.2d 434, 437 (Emer. Ct. App. 1946). See also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.i 359 F.2d 624 632-33 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
65. Nathanson, supra note 10, at 757.
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hearing.6 6 In some circumstances such a criterion would also
be satisfied if that person failed to prove that the comment proceedings were inadequate to provide the agency with a reasonable basis for belief in its factual predicate. 6V This model,
therefore, is basically the third model modified to permit evidentiary hearings only to the minimum extent that they are
constitutionally required.
The fifth and sixth models contemplate an awkward bifurcated system of review under which agency action is reviewable on the rulemaking record, but, on the petition of a party
seeking review, the rulemaking record may be supplemented
by evidentiary hearing procedures. The petitioning party must,
however, establish to the satisfaction of the reviewing court
that such supplementary procedures are necessary to prove the
lack of reasonable grounds for the agency action in question.
Incident to a petition to supplement the rulemaking record, the
reviewing court must rule that the issues sought to be litigated
could not have been effectively litigated in the comment proceedings through the presentation of documentary materials.
In making such a determination, the court might require
the assistance of the agency, 68 remanding to the agency: first,
for the agency's own determination as to whether the issues in
question could have been fully explored in the rulemaking proceedings, and second, if the agency rules in favor of the petitioner's procedural claim, for the holding of an evidentiary
hearing on the issues which the petitioner has raised. Such a
supplementary evidentiary hearing, if one is held, would
be limited to the issues raised and the proof and arguments
supplied by the petitioner, and the agency's rebuttal of the petitioner's case. The supplementary evidentiary hearing, therefore, would have a narrow focus and would permit the agency
to limit its rebuttal solely to the issues and material presented
by the petitioner. Moreover, to the extent that the agency and
66. This is the procedure contemplated by the authors of the FINAL REPORT
through which rules are tested for rationality. See FINAL REPORT, supra note
11, at 115-16. See also Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185
(1935).
67. In Overton Park,the Secretary's decision was tested, inter alia, under
a reasonable-belief standard. See 401 U.S. at 416. See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n
v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1960).
68. Although the determination as to whether the comment proceedings
adequately explored the issues involved might ultimately have to be made by
the court, the court might nonetheless find that a prior evaluation of the adequacy of the comment proceedings by the agency would assist it in making its
own determination. See Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 57475 (1952).
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the reviewing court were properly insistent that all issues capable of resolution through comment proceedings were so resolved, the number of supplementary proceedings actually held
would be kept to a minimum. Since the consequence of such
insistence would be to relegate issues to the original rulemaking proceedings, parties would be pressured to litigate fully
with documentary materials in the rulemaking proceedings.
Thus, it would be increasingly difficult for challengers later to
complain that certain issues could not have been adequately
dealt with in the rulemaking proceedings.
V.

THE AUERBACH CRITIQUE

Professor Carl Auerbach's proposal, 69 suggesting the Office
of Price Administration (OPA) model70 as an alternative to current rulemaking developments, is a powerful one. Indeed, the
power of the Auerbach proposal is emphasized when it is considered against the background of other approaches, such as
those embodied in the six models discussed above. Under
Auerbach's proposal, agency rules would be promulgated following notice-and-comment proceedings designed not to produce a record for judicial review, but rather to gather
7
information upon which the agency could base its decisions. 1
People seeking review of a rule would first lodge with the
agency that had promulgated the rule, a protest that challenged
either the rule's application or its overall validity. The protestants would be required to accompany their protest with documents and other papers constituting their case. The agency
could then either grant the protest, deny it, or order a hearing
on the protest. If the agency denied the petition, it would be
required to submit its own material and reasons for the denial.
The record for judicial review then would consist of the protestants' submissions and the agency's reply with its accompanying supporting material. If the agency denied the protest after
a hearing, the record would also include the record of that
hearing. Auerbach's proposal is thus designed to recapture the
simplicity, flexibility, and efficiency of notice-and-comment proceedings while also producing more manageable and focused
records for judicial review.
69. Auerbach, supra note 1, at 61-68.
70. OPA Revised Procedural Regulation No. 1, Procedure for Issuance, Adjustment, Amendment, Protest and Interpretation of Maximum Price Regulations, art. V, § 34, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,476, 10,479-80 (1944). See also Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-21, § 204, 56 Stat. 23.
71. Auerbach, supra note 1, at 61.
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Although Auerbach's proposal differs from the most recent
approach to rulemaking and rulemaking review articulated for
the Supreme Court by Justice Rehnquist, it is similar in many
ways to procedures in vogue in the two decades following the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. Prior to the
recent rulemaking-on-the-record developments, 7 2 agencies
promulgated rules after notice-and-comment proceedings. People could challenge the validity of a rule in preenforcement injunctive or declaratory judgment proceedings when the rule
was enforced against them in a penalty or licensing proceeding,
or when they could show that the rule was forcing significant
behavioral changes upon them. 73 In these cases, reviewing
courts were able to pass upon the rule's validity by examining
the rule, the statutory objectives, and the agency's reasons for
its rule. When the challenge went to the validity of the
agency's factual premise, 74 the reviewing court could obtain a
record from one of several procedural variations.
Under one such variation, a court could first require that a
petition be filed with the agency seeking either the rule's
amendment or repeal, or a waiver of the rule's application to
the petitioner, as a prerequisite to bringing a factually-based
challenge to the validity of a rule in court. 75 To the extent that
72. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. See generally Auerbach,
supra note 1, at 26-30; Gifford, supra note 26, at 259-70; Nathanson, supra note
10, at 724-46; Verkuil, supra note 48, at 193-230; Williams, supra note 27, at 41125.
73. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
74. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
75. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 201-04 (1956),
the Court had approved the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC)
elimination of licensing hearings in certain classes of cases by deciding in advance and through rulemaking those policy issues that would otherwise be involved in the cases. But the Court indicated that the statutory hearing
requirement was being respected because an affected license applicant would
nonetheless be entitled to a hearing before his application was refused if that
applicant set out, in his application, adequate reasons why the rules in question should be waived or amended. Id. at 205. The Federal Power Commission
(FPC) adopted this technique and also successfully persuaded the courts that
its general rules were not reviewable until they were applied in certification or
rate proceedings. See Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796, 804-05 (10th Cir. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 33 (1964). Even in those proceedings, however,
the courts were unable to review factually-based challenges to the Commission's rules because of the absence of a record upon which such review could
be predicated. See id. at 805-07; Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 618-19
(9th Cir. 1963). The Superior Oil opinion indicated that a certificate applicant
might have obtained an evidentiary hearing on the propriety of waiving the
rules on his application, if he had petitioned for a waiver. But the court did not
deal satisfactorily with the procedure available for an across-the-board attack
on rule validity. A contemporaneous comment suggested that the proper procedure to launch a factually-based attack on rule validity would be to petition
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this approach effectively forced objectors to petition the agency
to institute rulemaking proceedings, petitioners would have
been asking the agency to open those proceedings to all interested persons. Petitioners would have converted their own particularistic challenges into a general proceeding in which their
claims would be engulfed by the submissions of many other interested persons.7 6 If the agency denied the original challengers' petition, however, the procedural challenge would have
remained focused upon the challengers' own particular objections to the rule.
Had the agency responded by instituting rulemaking proceedings, and had those proceedings not revoked the objection77
able rule, the petitioners could have sought direct review of
the rulemaking proceeding on a record that would have consisted of the principal documents introduced into the noticeand-comment proceeding.7 8 Had the agency refused to institute rulemaking proceedings, the agency's refusal would have
been subject to court review on a record consisting of the petitioners' offers of proof, the agency's response, and the record of
any incidental agency proceeding inquiring into the wisdom of
9
the petitioners' request to institute rulemaking proceedings.7
If the agency had supported its refusal to institute rulemaking
proceedings with documented support for the challenged rule,
judicial review of that refusal would have resembled judicial review of the OPA proceedings in which the court reviewed indifor amendment or repeal of the challenged rule. See 16 STANFORD I- REV. 695,
702-03 (1964). This procedure seems most consistent with the positions of the
FPC in the cited cases. Despite the absence of petitions to amend, repeal, or
waive the rules, the rules involved in the cited cases were ultimately reviewed
in judicial review of certification proceedings when the court called up the record of the rulemaking proceedings. See Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. FPC,
352 F.2d 241, 243-44 (10th Cir. 1965).
76. Rulemaking proceedings, if instituted, would be governed by section
553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which establishes a procedure by
which "interested persons" are accorded the right to participate after
"[g] eneral notice" has been published in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1976).
77. Under then prevailing views, an agency rule might have been viewed
as an "order" that would be reviewable if its impact upon the person seeking
review was sufficiently immediate and injurious. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416-17 (1942).
Direct review of an order under the Hobbs Act was required to take place
within 60 days. See 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970); text accompanying note 84 infra.
Alternatively, an agency order might be directly reviewed under a special review statute at the instance of a "person aggrieved," again within a short limitations period. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940).
78. See note 81 infra.
79. 16 STAN. L. REV. 695, 703 (1964).
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vidual agency responses to separate rule challengers.8 O If, on
the other hand, the agency had supported its refusal to institute new rulemaking proceedings by referring to the prior
rulemaking proceeding that had given rise to the rule under attack, then the agency might have been required to supply the
record of that earlier rulemaking proceeding so that the court
could now assess its validity.8 1
This first procedural option contemplated that notice-andcomment procedure would have sufficed for exploration of factual questions underlying the rule.82 This option may have resulted, however, in a judicially-conducted evidentiary hearing
into the propriety of the agency's refusal to institute rulemaking proceedings-an evidentiary hearing in which the court itself explored the factual underpinnings of the challenged rule
in the guise of ruling on the agency's refusal to institute those
83
proceedings.
Under a second major procedural variation, the court
could-pursuant to the Hobbs Act 8 4 -have sent the case to a
district court for an evidentiary hearing in which the factual
questions underlying the rule would be explored. Or, again, the
court could have remanded the case to the agency for the preparation of a rulemaking record. 85 The agency then could have
80. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 1, at 62-63.
81. See note 75 supra. See also Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 352
F.2d 241, 245 (10th Cir. 1965) (court, in review of certification proceeding required the record of a prior rulemaking proceeding to be produced).
[We] required the Commission to fie the records compiled in the rulemaking procedures which resulted in Orders Numbers 232, 232A, and
242.
: : : Some factual basis [for the regulation] must appear and we
believe that the record before us affords that basis.... True the
presentations do not take [the] form of an adjudicatory type hearing
but the Supreme Court has said that is not necessary.
Id. at 243-44.
82. The Court has long taken the view that informal rulemaking procedures are a presumptively adequate means of establishing the factual base underlying agency rules. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192, 205 (1956) (full hearing unnecessary); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v.
White, 296 U.S. 176, 186(1935) (notice and "public hearing"). Those who wished
to make a factually-based objection to the validity of a rule and who wished to
have that objection explored in an evidentiary hearing might, therefore, have
been required to make an affirmative showing as to why the objection could not
be adequately explored through notice-and-comment proceedings.
83. See generally Fuchs, supra note 41, at 805, quoted in note 85 infra; 16
STAN.L. REV. 695, 703 (1964).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2347 (1970).
85. According to Professor Fuchs:
A party wishing to attack the validity of [a] regulation may ... certainly do so on judicial review of an agency order based on the regula-
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essentially repeated the rulemaking proceeding-which initially employed notice-and-comment procedures-using on-therecord procedures but confining the on-the-record procedures
8
to a defense of its rule against the particular challenger. B
Some of these procedural variations resemble the review of
rules under the OPA procedures and the Auerbach proposal:
judicial review took place upon a record prepared in an agency
proceeding concerned solely with the challenger's objection to
the rule.87 But if the agency had to repeat its informal
rulemaking proceeding in an on-the-record format at the insistence of a challenger, were not the efficiencies of informal
rulemaking destroyed? Perhaps not entirely, because the onthe-record proceeding could have been largely confined to documentary materials 88 by, for example, requiring that people
who wish to employ evidentiary-hearing procedures show affirmatively why such procedures are essential to their case. 89
Limiting the scope of the agency on-the-record proceedings to
the objections brought forward by persons seeking revieweven when those on-the-record proceedings were held subsequent to informal proceedings-might still have produced an
aggregate of administrative proceedings that was more flexible
and directed than were some of the operations of the hybrid
procedures in use immediately prior to the Supreme Court's
Vermont Yankee decision.
Although the fifth and sixth models were described above
as the most compatible with Justice Rehnquist's recent opinions for the Supreme Court,90 these models contemplate that
tion, unless a statute precludes review; and if the court needs facts on
which to base its decision of the point, it can remand the proceeding to
the agency for additional evidence or facts officially noticed to be
placed in the record. In the end, therefore, the attacker gets his hearing on the issue of validity, relating to both the facts pertinent to that
issue and, by way of argument before the agency or in court, to the is-

sues of law.
Fuchs, supra note 41, at 805 (1965).
86. This would be similar to the OPA procedures where the agency reconsidered the validity of a price regulation in the light of the particular attack of
the protestant. See Auerbach, supra note 1, at 63.
87. See id.
88. Recent commentators have repeatedly emphasized the flexibility of the
APA on-the-record procedures which, pursuant to section 556(d), permit, in appropriate cases, proceedings to be confined to documentary materials. See 5
U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976). See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 1, at 19; Nathanson,
supra note 10, at 727-28, 730.
89. This was the procedure followed under the OPA. See Direct Realty Co.
v. Porter, 157 F.2d 434, 438 (Emer. Ct. App. 1946). Cf. United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956) (FCC appeal procedure).
90. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
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the administrative record prepared in informal rulemaking proceedings will be supplemented with evidentiary-hearing procedures when it is necessary to ventilate factual issues critical to
the determination of rule validity. Should such supplementary
proceedings be necessary, however, these models would conflict with Rehnquist's insistence that notice-and-comment proceedings not be burdened with additional judicially-imposed
procedures. 91 Under models five and six, the agency would retain control over notice-and-comment proceedings, and the
power of a reviewing court to order supplementary evidentiaryhearing procedures would be limited to contentions raised by
the particular party seeking judicial review. Superficially,
therefore, it might appear that the aggregate administrative
proceedings would be more focused and would produce a better record for judicial review than the judicially-ordered hybrid
procedures of the recent past.
Two comments, however, are in order. First, so long as the
record of the informal rulemaking proceeding is exclusive for
issues that could properly be ventilated in that proceeding, all
objections to rule validity will, to the extent feasible, be forced
into the comment proceedings, 92 thus preserving the present
all-encompassing role of that proceeding. Only the few issues
that cannot be forced into a comment format will be handled in
the more focused supplementary proceeding. Second, insofar
as current doctrines of ripeness facilitate preenforcement review9 3 and statutes require that review be undertaken upon
conclusion of the informal proceedings, 94 all parties seeking review will tend to do so at the same time. Moreover, to the extent that these parties have similar or overlapping objections to
rule validity-a circumstance to be expected when challenges
to rule validity are made prior to enforcement 9 5 -efficient handling of these challenges may call for consolidation,96 especially
of the evidentiary hearings of the supplementary proceedings.
91. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-48 (1978).
92. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
93. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Frozen Food
Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956). See also Auerbach, supra note 1,
at 61-62.
94. See notes 43 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
95. Justice Fortas, dissenting in Abbott Laboratories,seems implicitly to
suggest that preenforcement review tends to induce courts to see issues of rule
validity in terms of "the abstract and the general" rather than in terms of "the
facts of particular situations" which, in his view, are generally more relevant.
See 387 U.S. at 200 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
96. Gifford, supra note 26, at 284.
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Consolidation would tend to produce a wide ranging and less
focused supplementary record.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR STUDY

This review of the Supreme Court's recent approach to judicial review, Auerbach's proposal, and a number of alternative
models of rulemaking review ought to include the following observations. First, the OPA-type procedures proposed by
Auerbach for current use were available prior to the birth of
on-the-record informal rulemaking and were indeed a proper
method for testing the validity of rules. 97 Some courts, however, failed to employ that machinery because they misunderstood the existing law and the available procedures under that
law.
Second, the replacement of off-the-record informal
rulemaking with on-the-record informal rulemaking places a
greater strain on the informal proceedings because the preparation of a record for judicial review becomes one of the paramount objectives of the informal proceeding.98 That increased
strain is sometimes offset by the advantage of concentrating
the final resolution of all issues connected with the formulation
and validity of the rule in the on-the-record rulemaking and its
immediate judicial review.9 9 Thereafter, the rule can be administered with a minimum of procedural snags. Under such a
scheme, on-the-record informal rulemaking may be an efficient
method of administration. This procedural arrangement functions best, however, when the subject matter of the rule is one
in which only a few identifiable persons are interested and
when, therefore, such persons can be expected to participate
actively in the rulemaking proceedings. 100 But even in these
circumstances the speed and efficiency of the informal proceedings are undercut when the participants in an on-the-record
97. See text accompanying notes 80, 86-87 supra.
98. See Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MIN. L.
REv. 151, 179 (1979). See also Gifford, supra note 26, at 282-87.
99. See Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 670 (6th Cir.
1972).
100. As the number of persons affected by a rule increases, the likelihood
increases that significant numbers of them will fail to learn about, and therefore will fail to participate in, the rulemaking proceedings. Similarly, many
such persons may even fail to learn about the existence of the rule after its promulgation until an enforcement action is brought against them. Cf. Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 283 n.2 (1978) (small businesses
subject to Clean Air Act can only protect themselves by daily review of proposed standards in Federal Register).
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proceeding begin to employ cross-examination and other procedures of evidentiary hearings.
Third, Vermont Yankee has sought to restore the efficiency
of informal proceedings by forbidding reviewing courts-except
in extraordinary circumstances-from ordering more than comment procedures from agencies. Because that case also continued the insistence of prior Supreme Court cases on the
integrity and exclusiveness of the administrative recordOl as
the basis for judicial review of agency action, Vermont Yankee
reinforces the tendencies of those decisions towards concentrating the resolution of rulemaking issues into a single administrative proceeding and the judicial review of that
proceeding,10 2 perhaps on a theory that such a procedural format is the most efficient. Implicit in the Vermont Yankee opinion, therefore, are two conclusions: 1) procedures of a more
judicialized nature than comment procedures are rarely necessary,1O3 and 2) when more judicialized, procedures are necessary, they can take place in supplementary proceedings
104
incident to judicial review.
101. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756, 758 (1972); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971).
102. This option, as has been noted, is taken by any statute which provides
for direct review of rules within a short statutory limitations period.
103. Thus Justice Rehnquist ruled that only when confronted with "extremely compelling circumstances" or "constitutional constraints" should reviewing courts impose procedures on agency rulemaking other than the noticeand-comment procedures mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978). If the administrative record is to be used as the basis
for judicial review and if the administrative record is to be a record of noticeand-comment proceedings, then the assumption must be that notice-and-comment proceedings are normally adequate to explore factual questions related to
rule validity.
104. As employed in text, the term "supplementary proceedings" includes
both those limited classes of remands in which a reviewing court can, consistently with Vermont Yankee, order the employment of additional procedures
and those collateral attacks upon rule validity in which, again consistently with
Vermont Yankee, a court could order the notice-and-comment records to be
supplemented with additional procedures.
Under Vermont Yankee, the courts cannot normaly compel an agency to
employ procedures in addition to the notice-and-comment procedures mandated in section 553 and they are to avoid the deleterious effects of "Monday
morning [procedural] quarterbacking." 435 U.S. at 547. Yet the courts can remand in the event of an inadequate record and, when "constitutional constraints" or "exceptionally compelling circumstances" require, they can
mandate additional procedures. 435 U.S. at 539, 543. The Vermont Yankee mandate, therefore, substantially limits remands in which additional procedures
are imposed upon agencies.
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When Auerbach suggested his recent proposal, 105 he was
concerned with restoring the efficiency and flexibility of informal rulemaking. Although Justice Rehnquist and the other
members of the Supreme Court also wish to further these
goals, they have proposed significantly different approaches for
restoring that flexibility. Both Rehnquist and Auerbach would
probably favor using documentary materials where possible
and restricting the role of cross-examination in technical proceedings. 0 6 A crucial difference in their approaches, however,
is whether challenges to the factual underpinnings of rules
must be made exclusively in an on-the-record administrative
proceeding in which all of the affected persons are expected to
participate or to acquiesce, or whether separate challenges can
be explored in administrative proceedings incident to rulemaking review where those proceedings are structured around the
objections of the particular persons seeking review. Auerbach's
and Rehnquist's approaches are largely based upon their own
respective assessments of how each approach would further or
retard administrative efficiency.1 0 7 The respective merits of
their proposals thus may vary with the subject matter, parties
affected, and other contextual matters connected with different
rules. Because the comparative advantages of the Auerbach
and Rehnquist models depend upon variables such as these, it
is likely that neither of these models will be superior in all circumstances. Indeed, as the prior discussion of a variety of
other models has implicitly shown, the Rehnquist and
Auerbach models are but two-more or less polar-models of
an almost limitless variety of possible ones.
Unfortunately, while the administrative law literature is replete with historical, doctrinal, and conceptual discussions of
rulemaking procedures and judicial review, it is sadly lacking
105. Auerbach, supra note 1, at 61-68.
106. See Auerbach, supra note 1, at 60-61; text accompanying notes 1-10
supra.
107. Thus Auerbach, drawing on the OPA experience, does not believe that
subsequent protests and judicial review of protest proceedings would offset the
efficiencies that would be gained from a return to off-the-record informal proceedings whose primary objective is to aid the agency in gathering information.
Rehnquist, on the other hand, assumes that regulatory efficiency is optimized
when doubts about rule validity are settled in judicial review of the rulemaking
proceedings that is based upon the record of those proceedings. This latter approach probably is more efficient when rules are of a type that affect a few persons, identifiable in advance, who possess the competence and resources to
defend their interest in the rulemaking proceedings and to seek direct review
of those proceedings when appropriate. Cf. FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at
108-11 (discussion of "adversary" hearings).
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in evaluations of the organizational dynamics of rulemaking
and rulemaking review.108 Serious study of these dynamics in
various settings is necessary to formulate sets of procedures
that will foster efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness in each of
those different settings. A typology1° 9 of the major variations of
rulemaking and rulemaking review should first be developed.
That typology should focus on the relationship of the subject
matter to the kind of evidence or material submitted, the scope
of the rule and economic impact of the rule upon affected persons, the number of participants in absolute terms and as a
percentage of those affected, and the similarity or dissimilarity
of issues raised by the several participants in the rulemaking
proceedings. The number of persons seeking judicial review,
the extent to which challenges are made on "factual" grounds,
and the similarity or dissimilarity of arguments raised by such
persons in the review proceedings should also be included in
the typology. An empirically grounded study of official
rulemaking behavior and of the procedural behavior of affected
persons in various settings might disclose a number of recurring behavioral patterns. If so, it would facilitate the formulation of several sets of procedures, each of which could be
designed to maximize efficiency, effectiveness and fairness in
its respective setting.i"0
108. A limited attempt to incorporate such a perspective is contained in Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents, and Administrative Justice, 37 L & CoNTEMP. PROB. 3, 22-33 (1972). See also Gifford, Communication of Legal
Standards,Policy Developmen and Effective Conduct Regulation, 56 CoNEL.
L. REv. 409, 461-65 (1971).
109. See, e.g., M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SocIAL AN ECONOMC ORGANIZAToN 92, 110 (1947).
110. Thus the present APA incorporates three basic types of administrative
procedures-informal rulemaking, formal rulemaking, and formal adjudication-and within those categories permits significant variations of procedures.
If the present three broad sets of procedures were replaced by other and more
numerous sets of procedures, the Congress would be significantly assisted in
specifiying the procedures to govern new regulatory statutes. Thus, for example, a study could show a need for six sets: 1) off-the-record notice-and-comment; 2) off-the-record notice-and-comment with some issues identified by the
off-the-record proceedings for further development through on-the-record notice-and-comment proceedings; 3) on-the-record notice-and-comment proceedings; 4) multi-stage on-the-record notice-and-comment proceedings; 5) on-therecord notice-and-comment proceedings with evidentiary hearings for issues
isolated by the notice-and-comment proceedings; and 6) evidentiary hearing
proceedings. Although Congress has, for example adopted the fifth of the
above procedural sets in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c) (1976), the advisability of
incorporating the more detailed content of these or alternative sets of procedure into a general administrative procedure act to assist the Congress in selecting procedures for application to new regulatory statutes would be best
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Students of administrative law have always emphasized
the variety among agencies and administrative tasks. Some,
such as Robert Benjamin, have recommended against the adoption of administrative procedure acts on the ground that the diversity of administrative activity could not properly be forced
into a small number of statutory categories."' The federal Ad,ministrative Procedure Act recognizes the variety of administrative behavior, first, by providing for three types of
procedures (informal rulemaking, formal rulemaking, and adjudication) and, second, by giving the agencies wide flexibility
within these categories to mold procedures to the issues before
them. Yet there is little effective control over an agency's procedural choices. Courts cannot second-guess agencies without
ultimately pressuring all proceedings into over-judicialized formats, as Vermont Yankee observes.
A study such as the one suggested would help to bring
about a widespread recognition that the variety of procedural
settings in which rulemaking presently occurs requires the development of several new sets of procedures-including accompanying formats for judicial review-that would both regularize
procedures and provide for diversity. This suggested development of several new sets of rulemaking procedures for use in
these newly identified settings would help to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and fairness of administrative proceedings
and thereby to extract administration from the procedural morass into which it has sunk over the past fifteen years.

determined after a thorough evaluation of existing experience under various
forms of present procedure.
111. 1 R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 9-17, 24-36 (1942). See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 191-92. On
New York's recently enacted administrative procedure legislation, see Gifford,
The New York State Administrative ProcedureAct: Some Reflections Upon its
Structure and Legislative History, 26 BuFFAo L REV. 589 (1977).

